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1. Introduction
Private foundations (PFs)*1 ensure the undivided, secure, and profi table placement of assets, thereby off er-
ing solutions for succession and inheritance issues, concerns over wealth taxes, and matters related to the 
global economy, which have been identifi ed as the three main factors threatening wealth creation both over 
the past 10 years and for the coming decade.*2  
While many countries*3 have chosen implementation of the Anglo-American trust to cater for these 
purposes, the European PF landscape too has been evolving in recent decades*4. The leanings towards the 
PF model rather than the trust model are probably related to the PF being a more familiar and a clearer 
structure for civil-law countries. Many would-be settlors*5 may be baffl  ed to learn that trusts do not exist as 
separate legal entities and that the proposed estate-planning exercise consists of an assignment of valuable 
and hard-earned property to a stranger, who will then hold it in his own name. Also, it might seem more 
secure to establish a PF, the validity of which cannot be questioned as easily as the well-developed doctrine 
of ‘sham’ trusts might allow*6. 
ɲ Public foundations, however, operate in the public interest (e.g., with religious, scientifi c, artistic, educational, cultural, or 
charitable aims). 
ɳ Knight Frank Wealth Report ɳɱɲɷ, p ɲɱ. Available at http://content.knightfrank.com/research/ɹɴ/documents/en/wealth-
report-ɳɱɲɷ-ɴɶɸɺ.pdf (most recently accessed on ɴɱ.ɴ.ɳɱɲɷ)
ɴ These include Luxembourg, France, San Marino, Romania, Malta, and the Czech Republic in Europe, along with Quebec, 
Canada. One of the most recent examples is the trust model provided by Book X of the Draft Common Frame of Reference.
ɵ Whereas in Austria before ɲɺɺɴ, foundations had no choice except to be charitable, the Private Foundations Law of ɲɺɺɴ 
enabled PFs. In Belgium, the PF was introduced in ɳɱɱɳ, and the foundation sector in Belgium has been growing ever since. 
Malta enacted specifi c foundation legislation in ɳɱɱɸ. The legal and tax landscape surrounding Dutch PFs dramatically 
changed with the introduction of a new tax doctrine on ‘segregated private capital’ as of ɳɱɲɱ. Even before that, one specifi c 
foundation form, the so-called ‘depository foundation’ (stichting administratiekantoor, STAK) for the purpose of acquiring 
and administering assets (shares) was widely used. In Luxembourg, a draft act for the introduction of PFs was submitted to 
the Parliament in ɳɱɲɴ, but it still seems to be under discussion for purposes of meeting the anti-money-laundering require-
ments. 
ɶ The settlor is the person who sets up a trust, transfers the assets to the trustee, and determines the trust terms (the founder’s 
equivalent).
ɷ The trust might be regarded as a ‘sham’ in a case wherein it is set up to harm existing creditors or with no actual change in 
the control of the property. In this case, it can be deemed to be void ab initio and brings with it adverse tax consequences as 
well as the exposure of the trust fund to claims by creditors, spouses, heirs, and other dependants.
http://dx.doi.org/10.12697/JI.2016.24.10
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Estonia has had its foundations’ regulation – in the form of the Estonian Foundations Act*7 (FA) – in 
place since 1995. As it does not impose specifi c restrictions on the purpose of foundations, they can be 
used for protecting private wealth or benefi ting present or future generations of a family and not merely 
for public charitable purposes. Nevertheless, the local high-net-worth individuals (HNWIs)*8 prefer to use 
schemes off ered by other countries, and Estonia’s export of the relevant service is a non-issue today. This 
article explores why this is so and proposes amendments to the current regulation that would give rise to 
a new wealth-management vehicle inspired by PF regimes introduced in other countries and that could be 
used by Estonians and foreign HNWIs alike.
2. The objectives of a PF
Worldwide, HNWIs use PFs for a large variety of purposes, the following chief among them: 
– They can be used to prevent the dispersal of the estate (business) after one’s death.
– They can ensure continuity in management. This could be useful when a founder has no children or 
if he considers some of his heirs not fi t to run the business or they do not wish to do so. 
– They can enable the reaching of a specifi c goal. The familial estate can be assigned to a specifi c 
purpose, such as providing for a relative in the case of incapacity or lack of fi nancial maturity. For 
example, parents with a disabled or minor child may be concerned with who will manage their 
child’s assets and how they will be managed upon their own death or perhaps when they themselves 
become disabled. Nowadays, people are tending to live longer, and there is an increase in the num-
ber of people who are aff ected by conditions such as dementia and Alzheimer’s disease, which can 
result in restricted active legal capacity. 
– Another purpose is to protect specifi c assets, as in the case of keeping the family home out of the 
reach of creditors. This could be especially attractive for businessmen or for those whose profes-
sions open them up to the risk of civil liability (e.g., doctors or lawyers), but in light of today’s eco-
nomic and fi nancial instability – and, in some regions, political instability – it could be attractive 
for anyone. It should be kept in mind, though, that there are usually some specifi c rules protecting 
creditors in a case wherein a PF is set up to harm existing creditors or with no actual change in the 
control of the property.
– They can also be used to optimise tax liability. 
As already noted, the FA does not impose specifi c restrictions on the purpose of a foundation and a founda-
tion therefore could be used for public purposes as well as private ones (including all of those mentioned 
above). 
It is possible for the founder to provide a series of provisions in the bylaws to ensure that the future 
functioning of the PF conforms to his wishes, including the objectives for the PF, the (set of) benefi ciaries, 
and provisions for the dissolution of the PF*9. A foundation does not have members, and the law excludes 
transfer of the founder’s rights to successors. The participation of the benefi ciaries in a PF’s management 
board is prohibited, and it can also be ruled out at the level of the supervisory board. In a nutshell, the PF 
provides a possibility of ‘locking’ the property in a separate vehicle on the operation of which third parties 
have no direct impact. Other forms of legal entity – such as private limited companies – do not provide 
quite the same solution. 
Nevertheless, much of the regulation in the FA seems to be inspired by times when foundations were 
used only in the public interest, which supposedly required stricter public control options.
ɸ Sihtasutuste seadus. – RT I ɲɺɺɶ, ɺɳ, ɲɷɱɵ; ɴɱ.ɲɳ.ɳɱɲɶ (in Estonian). English text available at https://www.riigiteataja.ee/
en/eli/ɶɱɵɱɳɳɱɲɷɱɱɵ/consolide (most recently accessed on ɴɱ.ɴ.ɳɱɲɷ).
ɹ HNWIs are defi ned as those persons having investable assets of US$ ɲ million or more, excluding their primary residence 
and collectibles, consumables, and consumer durables.
ɺ The mandatory provisions are listed in §ɹ (ɲ) of the FA, but under §ɹ (ɳ) of the FA, the bylaws may prescribe other condi-
tions that are not contrary to the law. Under §ɵɱ (ɳ) ɴ) of the FA, any further changes in the bylaws must be consistent with 
the objectives of the PF.
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3. Publicity
One of the biggest problems aff ecting Estonian PFs is the lack of privacy: the information on a PF is avail-
able to everyone from the register. 
According to §6 (1) of the FA, the foundation resolution shall set out the data (name, address, etc.) 
pertaining to the foundation, along with the founders, the members of the management/supervisory board, 
and the assets to be transferred to the foundation by the founders. 
Under §8 of the FA, other terms shall be set forth in the bylaws: the objectives; the (set of) benefi cia-
ries; the distribution of the assets of the foundation upon dissolution of the foundation; the procedure for 
appointment and removal of members of the management/supervisory board, along with their term of 
offi  ce; the procedure for amendment of the bylaws; the conditions for dissolution of the foundation; the 
remuneration of the board members; the procedure for use and disposal of assets; and any other conditions 
provided by law or that are not contrary to the law. This also means that the conditions for how the distri-
butions to the benefi ciaries are to be made or the requirements/exclusions for board members must be laid 
out in the bylaws, as the FA does not foresee the possibility of a separate ‘letter of wishes’*10. 
After the PF is registered, both of the above-mentioned documents (the resolution and the bylaws) are 
accessible to anyone (for a fee of two euros) from the register of not-for-profi t associations and foundations. 
In addition, the undefi ned terms ‘interested person’ and ‘person with a legitimate interest’ pop up here 
and there in the FA. For example, a ‘person with a legitimate interest’ may, pursuant to §39 of the FA, 
demand information from a foundation, including the information pertaining to fulfi lment of the objec-
tives of that foundation, the sworn auditor’s report, and accounting documents. Subsection 39 (2) of the 
FA grants the same right to ‘all interested persons’ if the bylaws do not determine a set of benefi ciaries. 
Presumably, those terms refer to persons whose rights would be aff ected by the activities of the foundation 
or its board members and are not meant to satisfy plain curiosity; nevertheless, these provisions would need 
a reassessment if the regulation of PFs is to be improved.
Furthermore, under §34 (4) of the FA, Estonian PFs have to submit annual accounting reports to the 
register, and these, too, are publicly available from the register. Hence, everybody can access all the infor-
mation pertaining to the fi nancial situation, economic performance, and cash fl ows of any PF. An audit of 
the annual accounts is compulsory on certain conditions*11.
If we look at other countries’ PF regulations, we can see that they off er more privacy. 
In Austria, the declaration of establishment can be split into two documents: the statutes and the 
bylaws.*12 The nomination of benefi ciaries and giving directions as to distributions to be made to the ben-
efi ciaries can be settled in the bylaws, which are not open to the public for inspection.*13 However, if the 
PF is to qualify for tax advantages, the documents must still be disclosed to the Austrian tax authorities.*14 
Austrian PFs are subject to bookkeeping and fi nancial reporting in the same manner as a corporation, 
but the public has no access to the reports of a PF and only the tax authorities are aware of its income, 
wealth, and assets.*15 A PF is, however, subject to an annual audit by an independent professional auditor, 
who has to assess whether the PF’s activities have been in line with its purpose as stated in the PF docu-
ments whether its funds have been managed properly and wisely, whether all housekeeping tasks have been 
correctly performed, and whether the PF is fully compliant with the law (including tax regulations). The 
auditor is also to review the PF’s compliance with the anti-money-laundering (AML) rules.*16 
ɲɱ Which, in the case of trusts (and in some countries, PFs too), is an indication by the settlor of the manner in which he wishes 
the trustees to exercise their discretion in relation to a trust.
ɲɲ See §ɺɲ (ɳ) ɵ) of the Auditors Activities Act (Audiitortegevuse seadus. – RT I ɳɱɲɱ, ɺ, ɵɲ; ɴɱ.ɲɳ.ɳɱɲɶ, ɹ (in Estonian)). 
English text available at https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/ɶɱɵɱɳɳɱɲɷɱɱɳ/consolide (most recently accessed on ɴɱ.ɴ.ɳɱɲɷ).
ɲɳ M. Petritz, A. Kampitsch. Austria: The Austrian private foundation. – Trusts & Trustees ɳɱ/ɷ (July ɳɱɲɵ), pp. ɶɵɴ–ɶɵɵ. – 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/ɲɱ.ɲɱɺɴ/tandt/ttuɱɸɶ. 
ɲɴ F. Schwank. The Austrian private foundation as a holding structure for global family wealth. – Trusts & Trustees ɳɱ/ɲ–ɳ 
(February–March ɳɱɲɵ), p. ɲɸɴ. – DOI: http://dx.doi.org/ɲɱ.ɲɱɺɴ/tandt/tttɳɵɸ.
ɲɵ Hasch & Partner Anwaltsgesellschaft mbH. The Austrian private foundation: A brief guide for the investors, p. ɵ. Availa-
ble at http://hasch.eu.dediɳɱɺɹ.your-server.de/fi les/channels/publikationen/Austrian_Private_Foundation_Brochure__E_.
pdf (most recently accessed on ɴɱ.ɴ.ɳɱɲɷ).
ɲɶ F. Schwank. The Austrian private foundation: Between transparency and bank secrecy. – Trusts & Trustees ɲɷ/ɷ (July ɳɱɲɱ), 
p. ɵɲɹ. – DOI: http://dx.doi.org/ɲɱ.ɲɱɺɴ/tandt/ttqɱɶɺ.
ɲɷ Ibid., p. ɵɲɷ.
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In Belgium, the bylaws of a PF are public*17, but the accounting o bligations depend on the size of the 
foundation*18, which also determine s where the relevant information has to be fi led, as there is no central 
database for the foundation sector*19. Only ‘large’*20 founda tions are to be audited.
In Malta*21, the Netherlands*22, and Luxembourg*23, there is no disclosure of founder or benefi ciary 
names, the PF deeds are not public, and there is no need for annual reporting. However, the fi nal version 
of Luxembourg’s draft law for PFs might come with some changes to refl ect the requirements of the Fourth 
Anti-Money Laundering Directive*24. 
The directive, which must be transposed by 26 June 2017, focuses specifi cally on enhancement of ben-
efi cial ownership’s transparency. In short, it requires Member States to establish central registers for the 
information on ultimate benefi cial owners (UBOs). The UBOs in the case of trusts and PFs*25 are the settlor/
founder, the trustee/administrator(s), the protector(s) (presumably, one or more members of the supervi-
sory board in the case of PFs), the benefi ciaries (or, if not determined by name, the class of persons in whose 
main interest the legal arrangement or entity is set up or operates), and any other natural person exercising 
ultimate control over the trust – whether by means of direct or indirect ownership or by other means.*26
This information must be accessible to competent authorities; fi nancial intelligence units; and, as part 
of customer due diligence, obliged entities (such as banks or notaries). Persons who can demonstrate a 
legitimate interest are to have certain access rights too (Art. 30(5)). The threshold laid down by the direc-
tive on ‘legitimate interest’ is that that interest must be related to money laundering, terrorist fi nancing, 
or the related basic off ences – such as fraud and corruption. Journalists are expected to be included in this 
group.*27 This has opened up a heated d ebate about privacy. In a PwC study addressing the impact of the 
UBO register, the following has been stated: 
It goes without saying that the interests of those involved may be seriously prejudiced by the care-
less or incompetent processing of personal details […]. [E]ntrepreneurial and high-net-worth fami-
lies fear that the public information will lead to undesirable mentions on ‘lists of millionaires’ and 
the not-inconceivable risk of blackmail, violence, intimidation, kidnapping or fraud. This is particu-
larly so in the case of minors or other vulnerable individuals.*28 
When we bear this in mind, it seems even more unacceptable that in Estonia excessive information related 
to PFs is open for everyone. And it is not surprising that people are choosing other countries for private 
ɲɸ A. van Zantbeek, J. Drayey. The Belgian private foundation. – Trusts & Trustees ɲɷ/ɷ (July ɳɱɲɱ), p. ɶɲɲ. – DOI: http://
dx.doi.org/ɲɱ.ɲɱɺɴ/tandt/ttsɱɶɳ.
ɲɹ O. Farny, et al. Taxation of foundations in Europe, p. ɲɳ. Available at https://media.arbeiter kammer.at/wien/PDF/studien/
Studie_Stiftungsbesteuerung_in_Europa_englisch.pdf (most recently accessed on ɴɱ.ɴ.ɳɱɲɷ). 
ɲɺ V. Xhaufl air, et al. Belgium Country Report, EUFORI Study, p. ɲɱ. Available at http://euforistudy.eu/wp-content/
uploads/ɳɱɲɶ/ɱɸ/Belgiu m.pdf (most recently accessed on ɴɱ.ɴ.ɳɱɲɷ). 
ɳɱ PFs that fulfi l one or more of the following three criteria: ɶɱ full-time staff , EUR ɷ,ɳɶɱ,ɱɱɱ in annual revenue, and EUR 
ɴ,ɲɳɶ,ɱɱɱ in total assets. – see Farny et al. (see Note ɲɹ), p. ɲɱ.
ɳɲ A. Cremona. Malta: Foundations – the new vehicle of choice? – Trusts & Trustees ɲɷ/ɷ (July ɳɱɲɱ), p. ɵɹɲ. – DOI: http://
dx.doi.org/ɲɱ.ɲɱɺɴ/tandt/ttqɱɵɷ.
ɳɳ M. Vogel. The Dutch foundation: The solution in tax planning, estate planning and asset protection for high net worth indi-
viduals worldwide. – Trusts & Trustees ɳɲ/ɷ (July ɳɱɲɶ), pp. ɷɹɷ–ɷɺɱ. – DOI: http://dx.doi.org/ɲɱ.ɲɱɺɴ/tandt/ttvɱɷɸ; 
M. Bergervoet, J. Starreveld. How private is the Curaçao private foundation, Curaçao trust, and the Dutch private founda-
tion? – Trusts & Trustees ɲɺ/ɷ (July ɳɱɲɴ), pp. ɶɸɸ–ɶɹɴ. – DOI: http://dx.doi.org/ɲɱ.ɲɱɺɴ/tandt/tttɱɹɱ.
ɳɴ Luxembourg’s draft law for introducing the PF did not require the names and details of the founder(s), the benefi ciary/
benefi ciaries, and the assets allocated to the PF to be published or disclosed. Some changes might be visible in the fi nal act, 
however, as it is being amended to refl ect the requirements of AML regulations. See C.N. Kossmann. ‘Luxembourg: The 
Luxembourg Patrimonial Foundation: what’s new in Luxembourg?’ – Trusts & Trustees ɳɲ/ɷ (July ɳɱɲɶ), pp. ɷɸɺ–ɷɹɱ. – 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/ɲɱ.ɲɱɺɴ/tandt/ttvɱɶɷ. 
ɳɵ Directive (EU) ɳɱɲɶ/ɹɵɺ of the European Parliament and of the Council of ɳɱ May ɳɱɲɶ on the prevention of the use of the 
fi nancial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist fi nancing, amending Regulation (EU) No. ɷɵɹ/ɳɱɲɳ of 
the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Directive ɳɱɱɶ/ɷɱ/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council and Commission Directive ɳɱɱɷ/ɸɱ/EC. – OJ L ɲɵɲ, ɶ June ɳɱɲɶ.
ɳɶ In the case of foundations the natural person(s) holding positions equivalent or similar to those referred to in the case of 
trusts are deemed to be the UBOs, under Article ɴ (ɷ) (b) (c) of this directive.
ɳɷ Please see Note ɳɶ above.
ɳɸ PwC Netherlands. Finding a balance between transparency and privacy – a study of the impact of the UBO register on high-
net-worth families and family businesses in twelve European countries, p. ɲɱ. Available at https://www.pwc.nl/en/assets/
documents/pwc-fi nding-a-balance-between-transparency-and-privacy.pdf (most recently accessed on ɴɱ.ɴ.ɳɱɲɷ).
ɳɹ Ibid., p. ɲɷ.
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wealth-management purposes. Publicity on that level could be explained in the case of foundations with a 
public purpose (charities) that have external donors or maybe in cases in which a foundation has engaged 
heavily in business activities (to protect possible creditors), but in cases of a classical family foundation with 
an objective of holding property, it raises the question of whether there are third parties actually needing 
that kind of protection. 
The third parties’ rights might come under discussion when a transfer of assets is made to the PF to 
defraud or prejudice creditors, is made within a specifi ed period before the transferor becomes bankrupt, 
is made with intent to defeat a claim for fi nancial relief upon divorce, or is made for purposes of getting 
around fi xed or discretionary family-protection rules pertaining to a donor’s family and dependants after 
his or her death. But even in those cases, there is probably no need for everyone to access the PF’s terms 
and documents, income details, and asset information – it would be enough if certain public authorities and 
interested persons (in a narrower sense) were to have the right. What might need reconsidering in updat-
ing of the PF regulations is whether the current regulations and rules on confl ict of laws pertaining to the 
above-mentioned situations are suffi  cient: the provisions regulating recovery (or ‘clawback’) in bankruptcy 
law, gifts made to a third party with the purpose of causing damage to a person entitled to claim a com-
pulsory portion in succession law, setting aside of transfers on the grounds of ostensibility or confl ict with 
good morals or public order (see §89 and §86 of the General Part of the Civil Code Act*29, or GPCCA), and 
grounds for the compulsory dissolution of a foundation (see §40 of the GPCCA and §46 of the FA). 
4. Bodies of a foundation: Two boards, four people
Another thing that needs reconsideration is the number of persons and organs required to run a PF. At 
the moment, §16 of the FA foresees two mandatory organs: the management and the supervisory board. 
According to §17 (7) and §18 (3) of the FA, the management board manages and represents the foundation 
but has to adhere to the lawful orders of the supervisory board. The management board may consist of one 
or several members, who must be natural persons. Subsection 17 (5) of the FA prohibits benefi ciaries or per-
sons with an equivalent economic interest from being members of the management board. Also, a member 
of the supervisory board shall not be a member of the management board (under §17 (6) of the FA).
According to §24 of the FA, the supervisory board plans the activities of the founda tion, organises the 
management of the foundation, and supervises the foundation’s activities. Subsection 26 (1) of the FA fore-
sees that the supervisory board must have at least three members (again, natural persons). The founder and 
the benefi ciaries can be members of the supervisory board (if this is not prohibited by the bylaws).
Consequently, the founder has to fi nd at least three trustworthy persons (in addition to himself) – one 
to be a member of the management board and three for the supervisory board – to set up a PF. For a small 
family-wealth-protection vehicle, this might be too much. 
In Malta, only the board of administrators is mandatory. The founder is the one who may exercise super-
vision over the administration of the PF. He is also entitled to intervene in the appointment of administra-
tors or in the disposal of the assets, when a court is dealing with these issues. Administrators of a PF may be 
either natural or legal persons. In the latter case, there must be at least three directors. Administrators do not 
need a licence to act as such. A founder may be an administrator of a foundation and may also be a PF’s ben-
efi ciary within his lifetime: if the founder is a benefi ciary, that founder may not, at the same time, act as the 
sole administrator of the PF. The terms for the PF may provide for the establishment of a supervisory council 
consisting of at least one member or for the offi  ce of one or more protectors with similar functions.*30
In Belgium, having a supervisory board is not mandatory, but a PF must have at least three directors 
(either individuals or legal entities).*31 The existence of a supervisory board is voluntary also in the Nether-
lands.*32
ɳɺ Tsiviilseadustiku üldosa seadus. – RT I ɳɱɱɳ, ɴɶ, ɳɲɷ; ɱɲ.ɲɱ.ɳɱɲɶ (in Estonian). English text available at https://www.
riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/ɶɳɹɱɹɳɱɲɶɱɱɵ/consolide (most recently accessed on ɲɹ.ɷ.ɳɱɲɷ).
ɴɱ J. Scerri-Diacono. Malta: A synopsis of the basic rules regulating private foundations. – Trusts & Trustees ɲɵ/ɶ (June ɳɱɱɹ), 
pp. ɴɳɱ–ɴɴɴ. – DOI: http://dx.doi.org/ɲɱ.ɲɱɺɴ/tandt/ttnɱɳɺ.
ɴɲ A. van Zantbeek, J. Drayey (see Note ɲɸ), p. ɶɲɱ.
ɴɳ M. Vogel (see Note ɳɳ), p. ɷɹɷ.
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In Austria, the board of directors has to consist of at least three members. The founder normally 
appoints the members of the board in its initial composition, and the court subsequently appoints any new 
members. A (current) benefi ciary, a spouse or partner thereof, other relatives (as far as the third degree), 
and legal persons may not be members of the board. The founder is not generally excluded from member-
ship of the board unless he is a current benefi ciary. A supervisory board is mandatory only if the PF has 
more than a certain number of employees*33. 
Under the draft law of Luxembourg, one or several directors manage the PF. A supervisory board 
becomes mandatory if the PF has more than fi ve benefi ciaries or if its assets exceed 20,000,000 euros. The 
same person can be founder, benefi ciary, and manager. A manager cannot be a member of the supervisory 
board.*34
In reconsideration of the necessity of the two-tier structure and the number of people involved, the 
rights and obligations of the current two boards and requirements imposed on the board members certainly 
need some reassessment too. For example, to ensure that the assets are managed professionally and profi t-
ably even when there is only one person to manage the PF, it is possible to foresee certain requirements as 
to the skills and personal qualities possessed by a board member. Diff erent solutions can be developed for 
diff erent cases: for example, that a requirement for a three-member supervisory board should apply only 
to a foundation whose assets exceed a certain threshold. And, as mentioned above, there already exists 
the notion of ‘interested persons’, who have several opportunities to turn to the courts to exercise control 
over the activities of the foundation: for instance, an interested person can request the court to decide on 
replacement of a member of the management/supervisory board*35, and, according to §38 (1) of the FA, an 
interested person may also request conducting of a special audit to address matters related to the manage-
ment or fi nancial status of the foundation.
5. The problem of double taxation
Next, we will analyse the main problems surrounding the current taxation of PFs in Estonia and suggest 
solutions. 
In practice, PFs are often used for holding shares of a company, exercising shareholders’ rights, and 
passing on the dividends received to the benefi ciaries. 
When an Estonian company pays dividends (or makes payments from the equity of the company, liqui-
dation proceeds, or other sources listed in §50 (2) of the Income Tax Act (ITA)), it has to pay income tax.*36 
According to §50 (11) and §50 (21) of the ITA, no income tax is to be charged if the parent company of the 
relevant company makes further distributions from that profi t. These exemptions cannot be applied to a 
foundation, as it does not have owners and the payments cannot be regarded as dividends or any other type 
of payments from equity. There is no fundamental diff erence in the case of the PF owning shares of a non-
Estonian legal entity, as non-resident companies also normally pay taxes in their countries of tax residency 
before transferring dividends to the PF. Hence, a second taxation of the relevant income takes place when 
the PF transfers funds to benefi ciaries. It is not entirely clear how the payment should be defi ned under the 
ITA, but there are two options: it is more likely that the payment should be regarded as a gift (which under 
§49 (1) of the ITA is taxable if made by a legal entity). The second alternative would be to defi ne the payment 
as an expense not related to business or activities specifi ed in the bylaws and tax it accordingly (under §51 
(3) of the ITA). Under both options, there is no further taxation if the benefi ciary is a resident natural per-
son (see §12 (2) and §19 (3) 6) of the ITA). When the benefi ciary is a non-resident, further taxation depends 
on the country of residence. 
ɴɴ C. Prele (ed.). Developments in Foundation Law in Europe. Springer Netherlands ɳɱɲɵ, p. ɲɷ. – DOI: http://dx.doi.
org/ɲɱ.ɲɱɱɸ/ɺɸɹ-ɺɵ-ɱɲɸ-ɺɱɷɺ-ɸ.
ɴɵ Ogier Law Firm. Luxembourg private foundation. Available at https://www.ogier.com/publications/l-luxembourg-private-
foundation (most recently accessed on ɴɱ.ɴ.ɳɱɲɷ).
ɴɶ If there is good reason – consisting, above all, in failure to perform a board member’s duties to a material extent, inability 
to participate in the work of the supervisory board, or signifi cant damaging of the interests of the foundation in any other 
manner – according to §ɳɹ (ɲ) ɴ) and §ɳɱ of the FA.
ɴɷ Tulumaksuseadus, §ɶɱ (ɲ). – RT I ɲɺɺɺ, ɲɱɲ, ɺɱɴ; ɲɸ.ɲɳ.ɳɱɲɶ, ɳ (in Estonian). English text available at https://www.
riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/ee/ɶɴɱɱɲɳɱɲɵɱɱɴ/consolide/current (most recently accessed on ɴɱ.ɴ.ɳɱɲɷ).
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When a PF sells shares of a company and subsequently distributes the gains to benefi ciaries, taxation of 
the distribution takes place in the same way as in the example above. As the gain is already taxed at the level 
of the investee, double taxation takes place here also, and the same problem is applicable for companies*37.
The solution for resolving the fi rst issue would be to treat distributions to PF benefi ciaries made in 
accordance with the bylaws as if they were dividends of a company. With this approach, all exemptions that 
are applicable to dividends would be applicable also to payments to benefi ciaries from the profi ts. Payments 
to third parties or expenses not related to activities specifi ed in the bylaws would be treated in the way they 
are now. 
To eliminate double taxation of the gains from sales of shares or other securities of entities, another 
exemption should be added to §50 (11), stating that income tax is not to be charged on dividends if the 
dividend is paid out of the profi t attributable to sales of shares or other securities of an entity that is not 
registered in a low-tax-rate territory*38. 
Another issue is the distribution of endowments to benefi ciaries. Payments of this nature are currently 
taxed similarly to payments from dividend income, as described above. However, there is no gift or inheri-
tance tax in transactions between natural persons*39, and when a company decreases its share capital and 
distributes the funds to owners, no tax is charged on the portion not in excess of the contributions made to 
the equity of the company. Hence we propose clarifying that distribution of endowments to benefi ciaries 
would not trigger tax for a PF or benefi ciary.
The above-mentioned solutions are proposed in light of the current Estonian regulation under which a 
foundation is liable for tax in its own right. But in other European countries we can fi nd a diff erent approach, 
wherein PFs are regarded as tax-transparent and the tax liabilities are imputed to the benefi ciaries (or 
founder). This has been called the ‘look-through’ approach. In that case, the PF itself is not regarded as a 
tax resident of the country where it is registered, and double taxation treaties do not apply to it.*40 The tax 
obligations of the benefi ciaries (and, in some cases, the founder) depend on the regulations of their respec-
tive home countries. This is why the ‘look-through’ approach seems preferable especially when the founder 
and/or benefi ciaries are not residents of the country where the PF is registered: the taxation system might 
be easier to understand. When a tax-transparent PF is established, a tax-resident holding company is usu-
ally established too, in the same country, to benefi t from the double taxation treaties. Usually, in applica-
tion of the ‘look-through’ approach, the PF is not permitted to be engaged in trading and other business 
activities.*41 In some countries, such as Malta*42, it is possible f or the PF to decide which approach – being 
considered tax-transparent or instead an opaque entity – it wants to be applied. A PF wishing to engage in 
normal business activities would select the company taxation approach, and a PF that would be interested 
mainly in focusing on family wealth-protection would choose the ‘look-through’ approach. The choice of 
one or the other option might also be informed by diff erences in tax consequences for founders and benefi -
ciaries in their countries of residence.
We propose that Estonia too introduces legislation enabling PFs to select an option of tax-neutral and 
transparent treatment (and thereby be exempt from corporate taxation) at the moment of establishment. 
In this case, the income of the PF would comprise only royalties, dividends, capital gains, interest, rent, or 
other passive income, since the PF would be prohibited from trading or business. The decision would be 
irrevocable; i.e., it could not be changed within the lifetime of the PF. 
ɴɸ See E. Uustalu. Põhimõtteline muudatus maksusüsteemi konkurentsivõime suurendamiseks: vabastame osaluste võõran-
damise topeltmaksustamisest [‘A fundamental change in the tax system to increase competitiveness: Getting rid of the double 
taxation of transfer of shares’]. – MaksuMaksja ɳɱɱɹ/ɵ (in Estonian). Available at http://www.maksumaksjad.ee/modules/
smartsection/item.php?itemid=ɸɴɱ (most recently accessed on ɴɱ.ɴ.ɳɱɲɷ).
ɴɹ For the defi nition of a low-tax-rate territory, see §ɲɱ of the ITA.
ɴɺ However, we need to take into account that the acquisition cost for the benefi ciary is zero and there could be tax consequences 
at the point of sale of the asset (e.g., with respect to real estate and investments).
ɵɱ OECD Model Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, ɳɱɲɵ, Article ɲ and Article ɵ(ɲ). Available at 
https://www.oecd.org/ctp/treaties/ɳɱɲɵ-model-tax-convention-articles.pdf, (most recently accessed on ɴɲ.ɴ.ɳɱɲɷ).
ɵɲ See, e.g., M. Vogel (see Note ɳɳ), p. ɷɹɺ.
ɵɳ Section ɳɸD.(ɲ)(b) of the Maltese Income Tax Act, passed on ɲ.ɲ.ɲɺɵɺ and last amended on ɲɶ.ɴ.ɳɱɲɷ. Available at http://
www.justiceservices.gov.mt/DownloadDocument.aspx?app=lom&itemid=ɹɷɶɹ (most recently accessed on ɴɲ.ɴ.ɳɱɲɷ).
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In addition, the ITA needs to clarify that: 
1. the PF itself is not a taxpayer*43
2. distributions received from a PF will be tax-exempt for resident*44 benefi ciaries (to avoid double 
taxation) in the event that:
a) the payment is made on account of the founder’s endowments,
b) the payment is made on account of dividend or other income from which distributions are not 
(double-)taxed for companies under §50 of the ITA, and 
c) the payment is made on account of gains from sales of shares or other securities
3. in all other cases, including those of interest, rental, and royalty income that will not be taxed on PF 
level, the PF follows the withholding rules specifi ed in §§ 41–43, with account taken of the income 
tax paid or withheld abroad in accordance with §45.
6. Economic considerations
Next, we should ask why a legislator would favour the establishment of PFs and hence make the necessary 
changes. If we look again at the other countries, we fi nd that the political rationale behind PFs has been 
based on three ideas: promoting the fl ow of domestic capital back in from abroad, preventing domestic 
capital from becoming capital outfl ow, and promoting the infl ow of foreign capital.*45 
What would be the fi nancial benefi ts for Estonia (the annual eff ect on GDP and the state budget) from 
non-residents starting to use Estonian PFs? We assume that most of these PFs would not be involved in 
trading and other active business, so a tax-neutral taxation approach would be applied and they would not 
pay income tax in Estonia. 
The main target markets for Estonian PFs would assumedly be Europe, Russia and the other CIS states, 
and Turkey, and the target client group would be HNWIs with more than $10 M of investable assets (mul-
timillionaires). Current numbers indicate that there are 145,000 multimillionaires in the countries men-
tioned above, and the forecast for 2025 is 192,000.*46 In 2011, there were 725 PFs in Belgium*47 and 2,881 in 
Austria*48. In 2009, Dutch trust fi rms served about 16,400 clients (though not all were related to HNWIs), 
who together held about 20,100 legal entities; that is, on average, 1.2 legal entities per client.*49  Hence, it is 
reasonable to assume that at least 20% of PF founders also establish a holding company. Proceeding from 
the above, we off er the conservative estimate that Estonia can attract only 1,000 PFs and assume that 20% 
establish a holding company. All told, we would have 1,200 entities. Current prices for domiciliation, man-
agement, and accounting services start at 7,200, including VAT, per entity.*50 From a survey of the Dutch 
trust industry examining the amount of other services (legal, auditing, etc.), these entities’ needs come to 
around 70% of the amount for trust services.*51 Hence, the total fees could easily be around 15,000,000 
euros (7,200 × 1,200 × 1.7 = 14,688,000). To calculate the potential tax revenue for the state budget, we can 
use the latest offi  cially available fi gure for total tax revenues as a percentage of GDP: 32.5%.*52 That points 
to potential for an additional 5 million euros for the state budget.
ɵɴ Within the meaning of §ɳ of the ITA.
ɵɵ In the case of the benefi ciary being a non-resident, further taxation depends on the country of residence.
ɵɶ H. Schneider, R. Millner, M. Meyer. Austria Country Report, EUFORI Study, p. ɷ. Available at http://euforistudy.eu/wp-
content/uploads/ɳɱɲɶ/ɱɸ/Austria.pdf (most recently accessed on ɴɱ.ɴ.ɳɱɲɷ).
ɵɷ Knight Frank Wealth Report (see Note ɳ), pp. ɷɵ–ɷɶ.
ɵɸ V. Xhaufl air et al. (see Note ɲɺ), p. ɸ. 
ɵɹ H. Schneider et al. (See Note ɵɶ), p. ɹ.
ɵɺ P. Risseeuw, R. Dosker. Trust Matters: The Dutch Trust Industry Revisited. Amsterdam: SEO Economic Research ɳɱɲɲ, 
p. ɹ. 
ɶɱ According to the Henley Business Service (Estonia) OÜ and Prospera Eesti OÜ price lists.
ɶɲ P. Risseeuw, R. Dosker (see Note ɵɺ), p. ɲɳ.
ɶɳ European Commission. European Statistical System (Eurostat). Tax Revenue Statistics, Table ɲ: Total tax revenue by country, 
ɲɺɺɶ–ɳɱɲɵ (% of GDP). Source: Eurostat (gov_ɲɱa_taxag). Available at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/
images/c/ca/Total_tax_revenue_by_country%ɳC_ɲɺɺɶ-ɳɱɲɵ_%ɳɹ%ɳɶ_of_GDP%ɳɺ.png (most recently accessed on 
ɴɲ.ɴ.ɳɱɲɷ).
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In the calculation above, we have excluded additional service fees such as the state fee and service fees 
for establishing a company in Estonia and other revenue following from HNWI visits to Estonia (e.g., air-
port fees and costs of accommodation and restaurant services). 
If all the obstacles described in this article were removed from the current legislation, would there 
be any additional advantages to foreign HNWIs in choosing Estonia for establishing a PF? The country’s 
fi nancial and political stability probably are important, as is the fact that Estonia does not have an ‘off shore’ 
reputation. The existence of e-residency*53, which enables establishing and running a legal entity location-
independently, might also be of help. Finally, in comparison to other countries, the prices of the related 
services are probably somewhat lower.
7. Conclusions
So, what is missing that would make the Estonian foundation a well-designed wealth-management vehicle 
for private purposes?
One of the biggest problems certainly is the current double taxation of PFs. Firstly, the exemptions 
designed for companies’ use to avoid double taxation of distributions made from already taxed income 
(such as dividends) do not apply. Another problem is the taxation of payments made on account of gains 
from sales of shares or other securities (the same problem exists for companies). We have described two 
approaches here – a ‘look-through’ approach, for PFs that are not engaged in business activities, and 
another approach, which brings the taxation of PFs closer to that of companies – and suggested a solution 
under which it would be possible for each PF to choose the approach it wants to be applied. 
Another major problem is the excessive accountability and publicity now involved: An Estonian foun-
dation is registered in a public register from which the information on that foundation is accessible to 
everyone. This includes the data on the founder and benefi ciaries; the content of the bylaws; and, through 
annual reports, information on the foundation’s income, wealth, and assets. If we look at other countries’ 
PF regulations, we can see that they off er more privacy and that, even though international AML regulations 
are moving in the direction of greater disclosure, our regulation still is disproportionate. There is no need 
for everyone to access a PF’s terms, documents, income details, and asset information – it would be enough 
if certain public authorities and interested parties (in a narrower sense) were to have this right.
The authors also question the necessity of the current two-tier structure and the number of people 
involved in operating a PF. A general suggestion would be that whether certain elements are of a mandatory 
nature could be tied to the type of activities or the economic indicators of the PF.
In order to justify the necessary legislative amendments, the authors suggest some fi nancial incentives 
for encouraging the establishment of PFs in Estonia by foreign founders: in the main, the estimated addi-
tion to the GDP would be 15,000,000 euros per year. For the founders, the advantages of Estonia would 
probably consist of our fi nancial and political stability, the country’s non-off shore reputation, the existence 
of e-residency, and lower establishment and management costs relative to other PF jurisdictions’.
ɶɴ A digital identity that enables foreigners to use Estonian electronic services. For information on the concept of e-residency 
see, for example, T. Kotka, C. Vargas, K. Korjus. Estonian e-residency: Redefi ning the nation-state in the digital era. Oxford 
Cyber Studies Programme Working Papers Series, No. ɴ, Sept. ɳɱɲɶ. More information about e-residency is available at 
http://e-residency.gov.ee/ (most recently accessed on ɴɱ.ɴ.ɳɱɲɷ). 
